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RECENT DECISIONS
But the foregoing rules as to "quotient verdicts" have no
application to a judgment rendered by a trial judge without a
jury; in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a verdict is a
decision by a jury, while a finding by a judge results in an order
or judgment and not a verdict. fancock v. Oliver, 228 Ala. 548,
154 So. 571 (1934). This rule is applied not only to findings of
fact, Scott v. People, 64 Colo. 396. 172 Pac. 9 (1918), but also to
conclusions of law stated by the judze, whether made during or
after the trial of the case, Amsinck & Co. v. Svringfield Grocer Co.,
7 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir. 1925). Since the decision of the court is its
judgment, while its opinion represents the reasons given for the
judgment, such reasons are no essential part of the decision. Crell
v. Hamrnans, 232 Iowa 95. 5 N. W. 2d 169 (1942), Ombrello v.
Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry.. 252 Mich. 396, 233 N. W 357 (1930);
Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 260 Pac. 401 (1927), and in the
eyes of the reviewing court are not material if the decision itself
is proper. Thus, it has been held permissible for a court to change
its oral decision, before judgment has been entered. Ritter v.
Johnson, 163 Wash. 153, 300 Pac. 518 (1931); Gates v. Green, 151
Cal. 65, 90 Pac. 189 (1907).
The instant case, therefore, does not depart from established
rules. However, it seems to be one of the rare instances where a
judge sitting as a trier of fact and law expressly referred to a
quotient method. While the trial judge may not have used the
quotient method mechanically, it seems remarkable that, if he gave
due consideration to the credibility and intelligence of the wit-
nesses, he treated them all as equally credible and intelligent.
While the holding is technically correct, it is submitted that the law
should not condone the substitution of any mechanical process for
the time-tested judicial process. In every case the decision or
verdict should be the result of reason, reflection, and conscientious
conviction.
John J. Callahan
COURTS--SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT
Petitioners were defense counsel for the eleven communists
tried for violations of the Smith Act, Dennis v. United States,
341 U. S. 494 (1950). At the conclusion of the trial, and after
entry of verdict, the trial judge, relying on petitioners' miscon-
duct during the course of the trial, cited them for criminal con-
tempt. In so doing he acted summarily under Rule 42(a) of FED-
ERAL Rums OF CRMIMINAL PROCEDURE. The sole question before the
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Supreme Court was whether the contempt was one which theaccusing judge was authorized under Rule 42(a) to determine
and punish himself, or whether it was one to be adjudged and
punished under Rule 42(b), by a judge other than the accusing
one, and after notice and hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed
the convictions, and held (6-3) that the word "summary" as used
in Rule 42(a) does not refer to the time in which a judge must
act, but rather to the procedure to be followed. A judge does not
lose his power to punish summarily by waiting until the conclu-
sion of the trial if the exigencies of the trial require delay. Sacher
v. United .States, 343 U. S. 1 (1952).
Federal courts have by statute the power to punish summarily
specified criminal contempts. 62 STAT. 701, 18 U. S. C. §401
(1948); 63 STAT. 90, 18 IT. S. C. §402 (1949). The Supreme Court
has recognized that punishment without a trial is a departure from
the usual requirements of procedural due process, Cooke v. United
States, 267 U. S. 517 (1924), and must be exercised within the
limits of the Constitution. Hudgivgs v. United States, 249 U. S.
378 (1918). There is, however, a narrow category of contempts
which are an exception to the usual requirements of procedural
due process. See In re Oliver. 333 U. S. 257 (1947). It includes
acts of a violent nature, Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1888),
committed in open court, In re Oliver, supra, where all essential
elements are observed by the judge. Ex parte Terry, supra, and
which threaten to disrupt the court's business, Anderson, v. Dornn)e.
6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821), so that immediate punishment is neces-
sary to prevent demoralization of the authority of the court. In
re Oliver, supra.
The only basis for the existence of the power to punish sum-
marily a criminal contempt is the necessity of immediate punish-
ment. In re Oliver, supra. The Supreme Court has advocated
extreme caution in the exercise of this power, Ex parte Terry.
supra; Cooke v. United States, supra; and has stated that the use
of such procedure should be limited "to the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed." Anderson v. Donne, supra at 231;
see also Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Pro-
cedure in Criminal Contemnpts in Inferior Federal Courts, 37
H. v. L. REv. 1010 (1923).
The holding of the Sacher case permits a judge to punish
summarily a criminal contempt, long after the acts constituting the
contempt were committed, and after any necessity for preserving
the orderly conduct of the trial has ceased. Therefore, the hold-
ing in the instant case is an extension of the rule that summary
procedure may be used only where the misconduct must be in-
stantly suppressed. It is also a departure from previous holdings
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that the statute defining the power to punish summarily must be
strictly interpreted and its application narrowly limited. See
Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 32 (1940).
Janet C. MoFarlan4
LABOR LAW-DEFENSIVE LOCKOUT AS
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
When negotiations between a multi-employer association and
union had reached an impasse, over an association-wide contract,
the union struck against one member. The other eleven members
immediately notified their employees that their stores were closed
because of the union's action. The National Labor Relations
Board ruled that the employers had committed an unfair labor
practice. Davis Furniture Co., 94 N. L. R. B. 279 (1951). On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence upon which the
Board relied did not support its finding that such action was a
mere reprisal to defeat the strike, and remanded the case to the
Board for a determination of whether such a temporary lockout
was lawful when used in a labor dispute solely as a counter-
economic force to resist the strike. Davis Furniture Co. v.
N. L. R. B. - F. 2d 1 30 L. R. R. M. 2294 (9th Cir. May 29,
1952). The Board again found that this temporary lockout vio-
lated §8 (a) (1) and (3) of the LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIoNs ACT,
June 23, 1947, 29 U. S. C. §158 (a) (1) and (3). Davis Furniture
Co., 100 N. L. R. B. No. 158 (Sept. 5, 1952).
At common law the lockout was considered a lawful device to
resist the threat of the labor movement. Iron Moulders Union v.
Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 46 (7th Cir. 1908); Sinsheimer v.
United Garment Workers, 77 Hun 215, 28 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Sup.
Ct. 1894); see also M-Willis and Montgomery, ORGANIZED LABOR 555,
(1945). The NATIONAL LABOR RElATIONs ACT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
29 U. S. C. §§151-166 (1947) which proscribes as unfair labor prac-
tices any interference with protected union activity does not ex-
pressly forbid or sanction lockouts. The Board has declared a
lockout to be in violation of the Act where the plant was closed by
the employer in circumstances that indicated that the real reason
for the closing was to avoid and destroy the rights of the em-
ployees as provided by the Act. N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning
Co., 98 F. 2d 97 (2d Cir. 1939); N. L; R. B. v. Stremel, 141 F. 2d
317 (10th Cir. 1944). See also, Teller, LABOR DISPUmEs Am CoLTZc-
TivE BARGAINING (1940 ed.), I, 247, 494, and II, 771-772.
Lockouts have been permitted where the employer would
otherwise be subjected to undue economic hardship, e. g.: (1) until
